Washington’s decision may reshape the diplomatic vocabulary surrounding the issue, but it will not, in and of itself, change the reality of insecurity in Brazil. On May 28, 2026, the U.S. government, through Secretary of State Marco Rubio, announced the designation of the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command (CV) as Specially Designated Global Terrorists and its intention to also classify them as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, effective June 5. The measure significantly alters the legal framework for these factions within the U.S. system and expands the potential for financial sanctions, operational restrictions, and limitations on international cooperation. The initial reaction in Brazil focused largely on defending national sovereignty. This concern is legitimate, but it does not, in and of itself, address the central problem: how does the Brazilian state intend to confront, using effective institutional tools, criminal organizations operating across state lines and transnationally, endowed with a high capacity for economic and territorial infiltration?
There is one point that must be stated plainly: Washington’s decision, on its own, will not directly benefit public safety in Brazil. It may have diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and investigative effects, but it will not stop cell phones from continuing to be stolen on Paulista Avenue or in Copacabana, nor will it alter the tangible sense of insecurity that shapes daily life in major cities. Without police actually patrolling the streets—with a visible presence, continuity, and a real capacity to respond—no external change will produce a noticeable improvement in citizens’ lives. This is precisely why the debate should not end with criticism of the measure, but move on to the truly relevant question: what will Brazil do, using its own tools, to confront criminal organizations that already operate on a national scale and maintain transnational connections?
Between Law, Strategy, and the American National Interest
Before discussing this opportunity, it is worth examining more closely the political nature of the U.S. decision. There is no basis for treating it as an altruistic or disinterested gesture. On the contrary, it appears to be part of a tradition of extraterritorial use of legal and regulatory instruments to defend U.S. strategic interests. A useful parallel in this debate is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). In February 2025, the Trump administration issued Executive Order 14209, suspending for 180 days the initiation of new actions and investigations under the FCPA, on the express grounds of protecting U.S. economic competitiveness and national security. This precedent does not warrant conspiratorial oversimplifications. Rather, it supports a more sober observation: international enforcement norms and mechanisms can function not only as legal instruments but also as vehicles for economic, diplomatic, and strategic policy.
In this context, the suspension of the FCPA and the Department of Justice’s review of its guidelines in 2025 have been interpreted by several analysts as a sign of more pragmatic regulation guided by the national interest. The central point here is not to argue for a linear conspiracy. It should be noted that Washington has demonstrated a willingness to calibrate its legal instruments in accordance with economic, strategic, and security objectives. The designation of the CCP and the CV can therefore be understood from this same perspective: a measure that combines concern over illicit transnational flows, domestic political signaling, and the external projection of regulatory power.
A terrorist designation can have tangible effects, particularly in the areas of finance and compliance. In transactions denominated in U.S. dollars or involving exposure to the U.S. financial system, banks, fintech companies, funds, and firms with international operations tend to strengthen their internal controls, customer due diligence, monitoring of beneficial owners, and anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing procedures. This trend, associated with de-risking strategies and widely debated within the FATF, tends to selectively tighten the compliance environment, raise due diligence costs, and increase reputational pressure on economic chains already vulnerable to criminal infiltration.
From a legal and diplomatic standpoint, the designation also opens the door to external pressure, more intrusive requests for cooperation, and broader interpretations of jurisdiction by U.S. authorities. This does not, in and of itself, amount to authorization for any unilateral action on Brazilian territory, a scenario that would run up against the limits of international law and state sovereignty. Still, it would be unwise to ignore that designations of this nature can be used as a political basis to intensify sanctions, extraterritorial investigations, and diplomatic pressure. The greater the perception of Brazil’s institutional fragility in combating organized crime, the greater the scope tends to be for more assertive external initiatives.
The Political Effects of Timing
It is also reasonable to consider the political context in which the measure was announced. In an election year, foreign policy decisions with strong symbolic weight reverberate in domestic debates, shape narratives, and end up being co-opted by various domestic actors. This does not allow us to conclude, categorically, that the decision was conceived exclusively as electoral interference. It does, however, allow for a more restrained inference: its political effects in Brazil were predictable and, most likely, factored into Washington’s calculations. In this sense, the language of counterterrorism functions not only as a security tool but also as an instrument of geopolitical signaling and diplomatic pressure.
Recognizing the strategic nature of the U.S. decision, however, does not justify complacency on Brazil’s part. The inadequacy of the official response lies precisely there. Invoking sovereignty in the abstract, without presenting a verifiable plan to tackle organized crime, is an elegant way of sidestepping the essential issue. For the public, the problem is less a matter of semantics than of concrete reality. The label used by Washington matters little if, in practice, Brazilian institutions remain unable to reduce homicides, curb illicit markets, protect vulnerable areas, and prevent criminal factions from continuing to recruit, finance themselves, and expand.
The same applies to sectors of national politics that almost always treat public safety as a rhetorical issue. The Brazilian debate remains swayed by punitive slogans and promises of abstract crackdowns, but rarely seriously addresses what really matters: institutional design, federal coordination, financial intelligence, database integration, and performance evaluation. If security is, in fact, a national priority, the test of consistency lies not in the tone of speech, but in support for measures that are legally viable, operationally sustainable, and subject to democratic oversight.
The institutional opportunity Brazil should not overlook
That is where the discussion ceases to be merely diplomatic and becomes, in fact, a Brazilian issue. If society demands a stronger response to organized crime, it is up to the federal government to present a legally sound action plan, complete with goals, priorities, funding sources, coordination mechanisms, and performance indicators. The challenge does not lie in announcing grandiose solutions, which are almost always short-lived. It lies in addressing old, well-known, and politically unsexy problems: federal fragmentation, poor intelligence integration, difficulties in tracing assets, disparities in capabilities among subnational entities, and discontinuity in public policies.
The first pillar of this plan should be the coordinated strengthening of federal action within the scope of the powers already provided for in Article 144 of the Constitution, particularly through the Federal Police, the Federal Highway Police, the Federal Penitentiary Police, and the cooperation mechanisms of the Unified Public Security System. The Constitution assigns to the Federal Police the investigation of criminal offenses with interstate or international repercussions that require uniform enforcement, in addition to the prevention and suppression of drug trafficking, smuggling, and embezzlement. At the same time, it preserves the central role of the states in ostensive policing and routine investigations. It is within this framework, and not outside of it, that the federal government should act with greater ambition, by strengthening borders, integrating intelligence, expanding asset investigations, training its personnel, and creating consistent incentives for inter-federal cooperation.
The second pillar must be the strengthening of the state’s presence in the most vulnerable areas, combining intelligence-led policing, the investigation of logistical and financial networks, coordination with correctional systems, territorial recovery, and, above all, an effective police presence on the streets. Intelligence is indispensable, but it does not replace patrolling, stops and searches, the execution of warrants, the continued occupation of critical areas, and the state’s visible capacity to respond. The available examples speak for themselves. The Pact for Life program in Pernambuco demonstrated that clear goals, monitoring, and integration between the police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and local government can lead to a consistent decline in homicides when there is political priority and continuity. Conversely, the recurring crises in the prison system of the North and Northeast, marked by internal control of facilities by criminal factions, intelligence failures, and poor coordination between state administrations and federal agencies, reveal how the lack of coordination transforms prisons into criminal command centers. Without planning, integration, territorial presence, and genuine law enforcement action, state-led crackdowns tend to yield only tactical and temporary gains.
The third pillar must be political and institutional: calling on governors and other responsible authorities to make verifiable public commitments to a national plan to combat organized crime. In a federation, cooperation cannot be imposed through rhetoric alone; it depends on incentives, agreements, conditional funding, shared goals, and transparency. A well-crafted federal pact makes it possible to identify who delivers results, who cooperates, and who prefers to preserve areas of administrative ambiguity. This republican approach is more effective than turning institutional disagreements into generic moral accusations.
The fourth, medium-term priority is to improve the national intelligence and financial investigation framework for combating organized crime. Rather than simply replicating foreign models, Brazil needs to strengthen structures capable of integrating financial, prison, tax, customs, and police data, based on a clear legal framework, institutional controls, and effective interoperability among agencies. Comparative experience and recent investigations indicate that factions of this nature rely less on overt force than on the ability to launder money, corrupt officials, infiltrate companies, and operate complex supply chains. Therefore, effective countermeasures require financial intelligence, interagency cooperation, tracing of ultimate beneficiaries, asset freezing, and the continuous dismantling of the business and technological networks used to conceal illicit funds.
Brazilian Responsibility
The deterioration of this situation is, to a large extent, the result of accumulated failures on the part of Brazil: policy discontinuity, poor coordination among federal entities, a fragile prison system, criminal infiltration of legal markets, and an inadequate response to money laundering. Recent history offers telling examples. At various times, major state-level operations against criminal factions were not accompanied by a lasting interstate strategy involving intelligence, asset freezing, and prison control, which allowed criminal networks to regroup in neighboring states. No foreign government created the PCC or the Comando Vermelho. But the expansion of these structures cannot be treated as a strictly local phenomenon either. In 2025, a mapping report by the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office was made public, indicating that the PCC already maintained a presence in at least 28 countries, with involvement in transnational trafficking routes, money laundering, and prison recruitment. That same year, police investigations revealed billions of dollars in financial transactions linked to the PCC and the CV, involving the use of front companies, fintech firms, and payment platforms. These findings underscore a fundamental point: contemporary organized crime combines territorial control, business-like rationality, the international circulation of illicit capital, and a high capacity for institutional adaptation.
This is precisely why the U.S. decision should be viewed less as an affront and more as a test. If Washington has decided to frame Brazilian factions using the language of counterterrorism, Brazil’s most intelligent response is not formal indignation, but a practical demonstration of institutional capacity. A sovereign country is not one that reacts with vehement rhetoric to external classifications; it is one that can investigate, prosecute, freeze assets, reclaim territory, and reduce violence using its own resources, with a solid legal foundation and administrative continuity.
Sovereignty Requires State Capacity
The United States’ designation of the PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations is consistent with a tradition of foreign policy that combines security, extraterritorial regulation, and strategic interests. This assessment can be criticized—and to some extent, it should be. But that does not exempt Brazil from addressing the crucial issue. If factions with a transnational presence, large-scale money-laundering capabilities, and territorial control continue to thrive, the problem lies not only in Washington’s rhetoric but in the prolonged inadequacy of Brazil’s response.
Ultimately, the central issue is not choosing between criticizing the political motivation behind the U.S. measure and tackling organized crime in Brazil. It is about upholding both positions with institutional maturity and a sense of reality. Sovereignty is not demonstrated through an official statement. It is demonstrated by the ability to control the territory, stifle illicit economies, coordinate federal powers, and provide public safety with legality, efficiency, continuity, and an effective state presence on the streets. Intelligence and coordination are indispensable, but they do not replace the police actually taking action, with a permanent territorial presence and a visible capacity to respond. If Brazil wishes to neutralize the symbolic and diplomatic effects of external decisions of this nature, it will have to demonstrate—through lasting results, not just rhetoric—that it possesses its own strategy, one that is constitutionally consistent and operationally effective, to confront its criminal organizations.
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